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After a mortgage is originated the borrower promises to make scheduled 
payments to repay the loan.  These payments are sent to the loan servicer, who may be 
the original lender or some other firm.  This firm collects the promised payments and 
distributes the cash flow (payments) to the appropriate investor/lender.   
A large data set (loan-level) of securitized subprime mortgages is used to examine 
if individual servicers are associated with systematic differences in mortgage 
performance (termination).  While accounting for unobserved heterogeneity in a 
competing risk (default and prepay) proportional hazard framework, individual servicers 
are associated with substantial and economically meaningful impacts on loan termination.     Loan Servicer Heterogeneity and the Termination of Subprime Mortgages  
 
1  Introduction 
In the days of old before the S&L crisis and mortgage securitization, a borrower 
needed to only identify a lender for a loan to purchase a home.  Typically this lending 
institution was locally based and the decision to make the loan was made on the basis of 
traditional underwriting standards: debt-to-income ratios, loan-to-value ratios, 
employment history, and location.  The same institution that originated the loan would 
also collect the promised payments.  Thus, part of the decision to apply for a loan from a 
particular institution could depend on the reputation of that lender as a debt collector or, 
in the parlance of the mortgage market, the “quality of the servicing of outstanding 
mortgages or loans.”  In fact, the bulk of borrower/lender interactions take place during 
the servicing of a loan and not at origination. 
Today, mortgage lending has been “atomized” so that different institutions may 
be responsible for each stage of the lending process (Jacobides, 2001).  For example, the 
origination of a loan may be handled by a bank, a mortgage corporation, a financial 
institution, or a mortgage broker, among others.  Often these subprime loans are 
packaged with other similar loans, and Wall Street firms create securities that investors 
may purchase that are backed by the expected cash flows from the mortgages.  These 
investors are then able to sell and trade securities based on a group of loans without 
having to deal directly with the borrower or the property purchased with the loan.  A 
Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) can also be used as a trust to hold the loans for the 
investors.  The SPV does none of the actual work of collecting the payments or even 
distributing them to the investors.  This is the work done by the servicer.   
  1The servicer enters into a contract with the trustees and is typically paid 25 basis 
points to service prime mortgages and 50 basis points to service subprime mortgages 
(Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 2003).  In the subprime market, the high 
delinquency rates and less automation in servicing tend to make servicing more intensive.  
It has been estimated that the cost of servicing in the subprime market can be four times 
higher than that in the prime market (Kogler, 1997).  The servicer is responsible for 
payment collection, cash management, escrow administration, and investor reporting, 
among other things. Another type of servicer, called a “special servicer,” is used to deal 
with delinquent borrowers by managing foreclosures and using loss-mitigation 
techniques if the borrower defaults. 
The servicer is the primary entity that the borrower interacts with after the 
origination of a mortgage.  It is in this capacity that the servicer has the ability to affect 
the performance of a mortgage as well as the perception that a borrower has of the lender.  
In fact, according to Fitch Ratings, even when a pool of mortgages has similar 
characteristics the servicer can affect the loss severity by as much as 30% (Fitch, 2003).  
In addition, Baku and Smith (1998) showed that the quality of servicing in the nonprofit 
sector can have substantial effects on the performance of loans. 
The primary research question asked in this paper is whether and how much the 
servicer matters to the performance (default and prepayment) of subprime loans after 
controlling for individual loan characteristics and prevailing economic conditions.  A 
competing risks model that incorporates unobserved heterogeneity on a sample of over 
56,000 30- and 15-year fixed-rate subprime loans is used. 
  22  Background on Subprime Servicers   
Since subprime loans default and prepay at elevated levels, the subprime market 
provides an excellent segment of the mortgage market to examine how servicers affect 
mortgage performance.  In addition, there has been substantial controversy and legal 
action over the behavior of subprime servicers.  Despite the fact that most attention is 
paid to predation during the origination of subprime loans, there is also compelling 
evidence of predatory behavior by at least some subprime servicers. The types of 
predation include:  forced insurance, abuse of escrow accounts, improper fees, and 
improper foreclosure proceedings.  Although the most notorious cases involve Fairbanks 
Capital Corporation (Fairbanks), other well known and large servicers such as GMAC 
Mortgage Corporation and Ocwen Federal Bank have also been party to law suits and 
settlements with regulators.  For example, Fairbanks entered into an out of court 
settlement with the Federal Trade Commission and the U.S. Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD) on November 12 2003 in which it agreed, without admitting 
any wrongdoing, to create a $40 million fund to aid those harmed by their servicing 
practices.  The agreement also states that Fairbanks will fulfill its obligations by 
accurately accounting for the arrival of funds and crediting the accounts in timely 
fashion, not forcing insurance on mortgages, answering the help line, responding  to 
borrower requests and concerns, among others.  Eggert (2004) provides an extensive 
discussion of the servicing practices of Fairbanks, discusses various methods of predation 
in servicing, and provides a nice summary of the legal history of subprime servicing.  
Despite legal and regulatory problems, Fairbanks is still a top 10 servicer of subprime 
loans.  After being downgraded by Fitch, Moody’s, and S&P in 2003, the 2004 
  3Fairbanks’ rating was upgraded after improved controls; and in July 2004 the company 
changed its name to Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. 
 This history implicitly indicates that servicers have a lot of control over mortgage 
outcomes.  For example, when a loan becomes delinquent, does the servicer immediately 
call the borrower and ask if there is a problem at work or home? Or does the servicer 
make no contact with the delinquent borrower and simply send a letter at 60 days 
delinquent saying the whole loan is due today and that foreclosure proceedings will be 
initiated (an acceleration letter)? If this heterogeneity in servicing practice is widespread, 
as indicated by Fitch (2003) and Baku and Smith (1998), we should expect to observe 
substantially different rates of mortgage terminations among different servicers.  As a 
result, the experience of the borrower and the expected cash flows of investors could be 
different depending on who is servicing the loan.  
2.1  Market Consolidation 
In many respects the history of subprime servicing parallels the history of 
subprime lending overall.  The origination and servicing segments of subprime lending 
have experienced substantial consolidation from 1995 through 2003.  For example, as 
shown in Table 1, the market share of subprime servicers has grown from just over 16 
percent in 1995 to over 84 percent in 2004.  Over the same time period, the top 25 
originators’ market share also rose from 77 to over 93 percent.  In addition, securitization 
rates rose from 28 to over 58 percent over the same time period.  This market wide 
consolidation has been associated with the transformation of subprime lending from 
niche products provided by independent financing companies to an important segment of 
the mortgage market conducted by large, well-known financial institutions.  For example, 
  4the top 25 subprime servicers include household names such as CitiFinancial, Ameriquest 
Mortgage, Countrywide Financial, Chase Home Finance, Washington Mutual, Wells 
Fargo Home Mortgage, and others (Inside Mortgage Finance, 2005).  
3  Data  
The data are leased from LoanPerformance (LP, formerly MIC).  LP collects data 
from pools of non-agency, publicly placed securitized loans.  Static information about 
individual loans is collected, such as documentation type, origination balance, purchase 
price, and servicer, as well as monthly updated information on loan status.  The database 
contains information on over 1,000 pools of subprime loans, representing over 3,500,000 
individual loans.  Therefore, the LP data is unlikely to represent the whole subprime 
mortgage market, but instead represents only the securitized portion of the market.  For 
example, Chomsisengphet and Pennington-Cross (2006) show that subprime foreclosure 
rates reported by the Mortgage Bankers Association of America (MBAA) are typically 
much higher than those calculated using the LP data.  While the MBAA does not claim 
that their rates reflect the whole subprime market, the data may show the different 
characteristics of subprime loans that are held in portfolio versus those that are 
securitized. 
For the estimation, we use data on loans originated from 2000 through 2005 and 
followed thorough the end of 2005.  The data set is limited to 30- and 15-year fixed-rate 
loans for owner-occupied single-family properties (first-lien purchase or refinance) from 
the LP database.  This will help to reduce unobserved heterogeneity associated with 
product type.  We include only those loans with an identifiable servicer.  In addition, in 
an attempt to reduce any erroneous information and include only substantial servicers, we 
  5include only the top 20 servicers (by number of loans in the sample).  Therefore, these 
results may not apply to the whole market.  In addition, the performance of each loan is 
followed for up to six years.  After eliminating loans with missing data, a sample of over 
56,000 loans is used in the analysis. 
Table 2 provides some selected characteristics of the loans at origination.  
Because the average FICO (Fair Isaac’s consumer credit score) is 661, these loans 
typically look like the A- segment of the market in terms of credit scores and reflect the 
higher credit scores of borrowers who use fixed rates in the subprime market 
(Chomsisengphet  and Pennington-Cross, 2006).  The average loan provides just over a 20 
percent down payment, almost one half of the loans have a prepayment penalty, and over 
40 percent provided low or no documentation.  As should be expected, the loans that 
defaulted tended to provide a smaller down payment and the borrower had a lower credit 
score at origination.  
The estimation follows each of the loans through time to determine in which 
month the loan defaults or prepays. In addition, many of the loans are seasoned before 
they become part of a security.  Loans are only included in the sample if they were 
seasoned less than two years before entering the security.  Therefore, the observations are 
both left and right censored.  The data are arranged as a panel with each loan defining the 
cross section and time being defined by each month the loan is observed.  Loans are 
observed until termination or right censoring after six years or in December 2005, 
whichever is first. 
 Table 3 provides the summary statistics on the variables used to explain the 
probability of prepayment or default in each month that the loan is alive.  In addition, the 
  6sample is broken down into large servicers and small servicers.  Large or big servicers are 
those identified by Inside B&C Lending as one of the top 25 B&C at some point between 
2000 and 2004.  All other servicers included in the data are identified as small servicers.  
Over 43,000 loans are serviced by large or big servicers and over 13,000 loans by small 
servicers.  Eight servicers are included for both the large and small servicer samples.
1   
In general the loan characteristics are very similar for both small and large 
servicers.  For example, the FICO credit scores, FICO, are only nine points apart and the 
Loan-To-Value ratio in the current month, CLTV, are almost identical on average.  Other 
loan characteristics such as the existence of a prepayment penalty in force for the current 
month, PPEN; low or no documentation, LNDOC, are all very similar.  Therefore, at least 
in terms of observed mortgage characteristics, there does not seem to be much if any 
difference between loans serviced by the largest servicers versus the rest of the industry. 
4  Motivations to Terminate a Mortgage 
Despite the fact that the borrower is technically in default when a single payment 
is missed or any other provision of the mortgage is violated, it is common practice for 
lenders not to pursue the property or even enter into other loss-mitigating strategies for 
short-term delinquencies.   
The academic literature on mortgage termination has used many different 
definitions of default, ranging from “90-days delinquent” to “the end of foreclosure 
proceedings” or “Real Estate Owned (REO) property”.  In this paper, default is defined as 
any month that the loan becomes REO property or when foreclosure proceedings are 
initiated.  This definition delineates when the lender/investor has actively taken or 
attempted to take possession of the property.  Once the loan is declared to be in default, 
  7the loan is considered terminated.
2  The study of the final disposition of property in REO 
or in foreclosure is left to further research.  The definition of a prepaid loan is when the 
balance becomes zero and in the prior month the loans was either current or delinquent.  
Prepayments, then, are motivated by many different factors including interest rates, 
mobility, severe loan delinquency, and improving credit history. 
4.1  Motivations to Default 
Households primarily default (REO or enter foreclosure) on a mortgage when the 
value of the mortgage is larger than the value of the property.  To measure whether it is 
“in the money” to default on the loan and put the mortgage back to the lender/investor, 
the current loan-to-value ratio, CLTV, is used.  CLTV is created using the stated 
outstanding balance of the loan at the beginning of the month, as indicated in the servicer 
records, and the updated house value using the metropolitan area repeat sales price index 
as reported by the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO).  It is 
expected that low or negative equity will make it more likely that the loan will default.  
However, it is not expected that loans will automatically default when in negative equity.  
For example, there can be substantial transaction costs, which could vary by borrower, 
property, or even servicer, that could affect the prescription of and reaction to a negative 
equity position.  The measure of negative equity is also only a proxy because individual 
house prices will grow at varied rates.  Due to this measurement error previous studies 
have constructed a variable (e.g., Deng et. al., 2000; Pennington-Cross, 2003) that 
explicitly includes individual property appreciation dispersion.  Unfortunately, the 
information at the metropolitan area level is not provided to the general public.  However, 
these studies did not observe the monthly outstanding balance on the loan and used only 
  8the amortization schedule to update the outstanding balance in each month.  Because of 
the high rate of delinquency (Danis and Pennington-Cross, 2005) of subprime loans this 
approach would lead to an overestimate of the equity in the home.  The measure of 
CLTV used in this paper corrects for this problem by using the actual outstanding loan 
balance in each month instead of the amortization schedule.  However, since the property 
level appreciation rates are only proxied for by the metropolitan area appreciation rate, it 
will be important for the empirical estimation to allow for unobserved heterogeneity in 
the termination of the loans.  
The use of CLTV to measure whether it is “in the money” to default on the loan 
and put the mortgage back to the lender/investor provides only a static point of view.  
The optimal time to default is best seen in a dynamic and forward looking context 
because payments are made sequentially through time.  For example, it may be in the 
money to default on a particular day, but this value could become larger or smaller in the 
future depending on future equity payments and house price appreciation patterns.  As a 
result it may be optimal to delay putting the mortgage even if the property is currently in 
a negative equity position (Kau and Kim, 1994).  Therefore, there is value in the option to 
default and this value is larger when there is more variability in price appreciation 
patterns.  Therefore, we would expect that the variance of house prices, VARHPI, 
measured as the standard deviation in the monthly growth rate of the OFHEO house price 
index
3 in the prior two years, would be negatively associated with the probability of 
default. 
Households may also have a difficult time making payments when there is stress 
in the labor market.  To proxy for labor market conditions the metropolitan area 
  9unemployment rate, UNEMP, as collected from the Bureau of Labor and Statistics (BLS) 
is lagged one month.  Again, this is only a crude proxy for when the borrower actually 
does become unemployed.  However, we should expect higher unemployment rates to be 
associated with higher probabilities of default. 
Elevated probabilities of default could also be associated with the characteristics 
of the loan itself.  For example, Quercia et al. (2005) found that prepayment penalties, 
PPEN, were associated with higher probabilities of default.  One potential explanation of 
this result is that, in some cases, defaulting may be a more attractive option than 
prepaying the loan when delinquent, because the relative cost of prepaying is higher due 
to the penalty.   
The ability of the borrower to meet prior financial obligations may also provide a 
good indication of their ability to meet future financial obligations.  Therefore, it is 
expected that loans with higher consumer credit scores, FICO, at origination will be less 
likely to default in the future.  
When the applicant for a loan provides limited or no documentation, LNDOC, of 
income or down payment source, this may indicate additional risks associated with 
income flows in the future.  Therefore, it is possible that providing low or no 
documentation will be associated with elevated default probabilities. 
Lastly, lenders will often allow loans to season before trying to package it into a 
security to prove that the loan was properly underwritten and had sufficient compensating 
factors.  Therefore, seasoning may indicate other unobserved problems with the loan.  We 
include SEASON, a dummy variable indicating the loan has been seasoned one year or 
longer, and expect that it will be associated with a higher probability of default.  
  104.2  Motivations to Prepay 
One financial incentive to prepay a fixed rate loan is to refinance to take 
advantage of lower interest rates.  To measure the extent that it is in the money to 
refinance, the present discounted cost of all future payments on the current mortgage are 
compared with the present discounted cost of future payments on a new mortgage at 
prevailing rates.   
The monthly payments for each borrower j can be calculated for fixed rate mortgages 
using the original balance (O), the term of the mortgage (TM), and the interest rate on the 
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In each time period PDCjc is calculated as long as the loan exists.  For the refinanced loan 
the same calculations are used to estimate the present discounted cost, PDCjr, while using 
the outstanding balance as the original balance, the remaining term as the term of the loan 
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The variable REFIjt is defined as the percentage reduction in the present values of future 
payments that borrower j will gain in time period t if the mortgage is refinanced.  The 
  11choice of the correct refinancing interest rate is complicated by the use of risk-based 
pricing in the subprime market.  Therefore, to hold credit quality constant the interest rate 
on the refinanced mortgage is defined as the market prime rate, as collected from the 
Freddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey (PMMS) in that month, increased by the 
percent spread between the contract rate on the existing loan at origination and the 
PMMS rate at origination. 
Again, this measure of interest rate--driven prepayments provides a static look at 
the extent that it is in the money to refinance.  Similar to default, the variance of interest 
rates can make the value of the option to refinance larger.  It may be worth delaying the 
refinance because interest rates may drop even more in the future.  Therefore, interest rate 
variance, VARINT, measured by the standard deviation in the one-year constant maturity 
U.S. Treasury bill yield over the prior 15 months, should be negatively associated with 
the probability of prepaying. 
While the amount of equity has been found to be a strong predictor of default, it 
can also make it easier to refinance a loan.  For example, if a loan has substantial positive 
equity, even those borrowers with low credit scores should be able to refinance with a 
subprime lender because the equity compensates for the risk that the borrower might not 
be able to make future payments.  In contrast, for loans with low or negative equity, it can 
become more difficult to find financing, even in the subprime market (Alexander et al., 
2002).  Therefore, it is expected that loans with high CLTV are less likely to prepay. 
Locations with higher unemployment rates are more likely to be associated with 
individual borrower unemployment spells.  The impact of unemployment on prepayment 
can be either negative or positive.  Being unemployed should make it more difficult to 
  12refinance and thus lower the probability of prepaying.  However, prepaying a loan can be 
one way of terminating a loan that is delinquent and often can be a cheaper method than 
going through foreclosure and defaulting on a loan.  Empirical research, not surprisingly, 
has found mixed results.  Using subprime loans, Quercia et al. (2005) find that state 
unemployment rates are associated with a higher probability of prepayment, while Deng 
et al. (2000) find state unemployment rates to be associated with higher and lower 
probabilities of prepaying, depending on location for prime loans.   
Over 40 percent of the loan-months have a prepayment penalty, PPEN, in effect.  
Since these penalties make it more expensive to refinance the loan, the probability of 
prepaying should be lower.  In addition, the ability of the borrower to meet prior financial 
obligations, measured by their consumer credit, FICO score, may be associated with an 
increase or decrease in prepayment probabilities.  While the reasoning for any 
relationship is unclear, Pennington-Cross (2003) found that high-interest-rate loans with 
high credit scores were more likely to prepay. 
5  A Competing Risks Model 
As previously noted, a loan can terminate through default or prepayment – two 
options that compete with each other to be the first observed event.  In addition, there 
may be unobserved characteristics that could influence the termination of the loans.  To 
control for unobserved heterogeneity, the model estimates what fraction of the loans in 
the sample belong to discrete unobserved types or groups. 
This section reviews a competing risk proportional hazard model that was 
introduced in the study of unemployment duration (McCall, 1996).
4  Prior empirical 
work in the termination of mortgages has also used this same approach (e.g., Ambrose 
  13and LaCour-Little, 2001; Deng, Quigley, and Van Order, 2000; Alexander et al., 2002; 
Pennington-Cross, 2003).    
Random variables indicating the time to default, Td, and the time to prepayment, 
Tp, have a continuous probability distribution, f(tw), where tw is a realization of Tw(w=p,d; 
p=prepay, d=default).  The joint survivor function for loan j is then Sj(tp,td)=π(Tp>tp, 
Td>td | xtj) and is conditioned on exogenous variables, xtj, including the baseline (loan age) 
hazard function.  The shortest mortgage duration is observed duration, Tj=min(Tp,Td,Tc).  
The survivor function is defined as follows 
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The N loans are indexed by j, time is indexed by t and measured in months, and the 
outcomes in each month include prepay, default, and continue (indexed by p, d, or c).  
The baseline hazard function is parameterized by loan age and age squared.  The 
exogenous variables can be time constant or time varying.   θp and θd are the unobserved 
prepay and default heterogeneity parameters.  They can correlate with each other, but are 
assumed to be jointly independent of xjt.  Two groups or types of loans are identified with 
frequency or mass of m1 and m2.
5  θp and θd proportionally shift the hazards for the four 
types of loans (θp1, θp2, θd1, θd2), 1 and 2 index the mass or frequency of each group.    
The hazard probabilities of prepay, Apj(t), default Adj(t), or continuing Acj(t) in time period 
t are defined as 
  14( ) ( ) ( ) d p j d p j d p pj t t S t t S t A θ θ θ θ θ θ , | , 1 , | , , | + − =  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) d p j d p j d p j d p j t t S t t S t t S t t S θ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ , | , 1 , | 1 , , | 1 , 1 , | , 5 . + − + − + + + −  
( ) ( ) ( ) d p j d p j d p dj t t S t t S t A θ θ θ θ θ θ , | 1 , , | , , | + − =  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) d p j d p j d p j d p j t t S t t S t t S t t S θ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ , | , 1 , | 1 , , | 1 , 1 , | , 5 . + − + − + + + −  
( ) ( ) d p j d p cj t t S t A θ θ θ θ , | , , | =  .  (5) 
For prepay and default hazards, the term multiplied by 1/2 adjusts the duration because 
months are a discrete measure of time, not continuous.  The unconditional probability can 
be expressed by 
() ( ) ( ) c d p z t A m t A m t F d p z d p z z , , , , | , | 2 2 2 1 1 1 = + = θ θ θ θ . (6) 
The sum of the m1 and m2 must equal 1 (m1 + m2=1).  In the estimation m1 is normalized 
to one and m2 is estimated as any nonnegative number.  The log of likelihood of the 
proportional competing risks model is as follows 
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δzj, z=p, d, c indicate reason for the termination of the j
th loan (prepayment, default, or 
right censoring).  
The conditional probability of borrower j prepaying the mortgage in period t is 
therefore  
( ) ( ) ( ) w w jt w jt w x t T x t T θ β θ π exp exp 1 1 , , − − = − > =  .  (8) 
6  Results 
The results of the competing risks proportional hazard model are presented in the 
appendix.  Two different samples are used and four different model specifications are 
estimated.  Tables A1 and A2 present the results for the large or big servicer sample and 
tables A3 and A4 present the results for the small servicer sample.  For each sample, four 
  15model specifications are shown.  Models 2 and 4 include servicer specific dummy 
variables and Models 3 and 4 include unobserved heterogeneity.  Most variables are 
largely significant and of the expected sign.   
Because it is difficult to interpret the coefficients directly, elasticity estimates are 
provided in Table 4 and a series of figures illustrate the results for a few key variables.  
The reported elasticity is the percent change in the predicted termination (default or 
prepay) probability in response to a one-standard-deviation increase in continuous 
variables from their mean or an increase from 0 to 1 for dummy variables. Elasticities are 
reported for the large servicer sample and the small servicer sample.  All reported 
elasticities include servicer-specific fixed effects and unobserved heterogeneity as 
estimated in Model 4.  Test of interactions of servicers with key variables such as CLTV 
and REFI were largely insignificant or could not converge.  Therefore, the results focus 
on the impact of fixed effects of servicers on the probability of terminating the loans. 
6.1  Servicer  
Even after controlling for observed and unobserved loan and market 
characteristics, servicers are associated with very large increases and decreases in the 
probability of defaulting and prepaying.  For the large servicers, the impact on the 
probability of default ranges from -61 percent to +73 percent, relative to servicers 1, 3 
and 8.
6  The impact is also large on the probability of prepaying and ranges from +60 
percent to +555 percent, relative to servicer 1.  For the smaller servicers, the impacts are 
again very large.  For example, servicer 5 has a 54 percent higher probability of default 
on an identical loan than servicer 1-4, and 8.  For prepayment, the fixed effects vary from 
-8 percent to -65 percent. 
  16In addition, it is reasonable to expect servicer impacts to vary through time due to 
the dynamic nature of the industry.  We test to see if such a time-varying effect exists by 
adding to Model 4 interactions of servicer dummies and the calendar years in which the 
servicer is actively servicing loans.  For a given servicer, only the years in which a 
reasonable number of loan terminations occur (50 defaults/prepays or more) are used in 
the test and therefore the reference years will be different for each servicer.  Table 5 
reports the elasticity (percentage change in predicted termination) for the large servicers.  
Elasticities are cumulative so that they indicate the total (not marginal) effects of a given 
servicer in a given year.  The results indicate that for most large servicers the effect on 
loan termination can vary through time.  For example, servicers 2 and 4 experienced 
more defaults in 2004 and 2005 while servicer 5 had fewer defaults in 2005 than earlier 
years.  Servicers 2 and 5 also had fewer prepaid loans in the more recent years.  However, 
the direction and general impact of the servicer fixed effects are fairly similar (for 
example, the fixed effects do not change sign).  In addition, not all servicer effects change 
through time.  The effect of servicer 7 on loan terminations, for example, is largely 
constant from 2000 to 2005.            
6.2  Other Covariates 
As shown in Figure 1 and consistent with prior literature, borrowers with higher 
credit scores are less likely to default. In fact, a one-standard-deviation increase in the 
FICO score decreases the probability of default by approximately 36 to 61 percent.  The 
responsiveness to credit scores is much higher for loans serviced by big servicers.  In 
addition, better or higher credit scores at origination are associated with lower 
probabilities of prepaying.  However, the proportional impact is much smaller and 
  17ranging from -10 to 8 percent.  Figure 1 also shows that the average loan using a big 
servicer tends to default less often than the average loan using a small servicer. 
As shown in Figure 2 and consistent with prior literature, the impact of current 
equity in the home on mortgage terminations meets prior expectation.  For example, a 
one-standard-deviation increase in CLTV increases the probability of default by 
approximately 66 percent and decreases the probability of prepaying by approximately 9 
percent.  Therefore, current equity has a strong impact on the termination of subprime 
loans.  In addition, the impact is almost identical for both servicer types.  
The impact of unemployment rates, UNEMP, is unclear from the results.  
Depending on the sample and specification, the impact of unemployment rates can be 
insignificant or positive or negative.  Therefore, there does not seem to be any strong link 
between prepay or default probabilities and metropolitan area unemployment rates. 
As anticipated, loans with prepay penalties in effect, PPEN, prepay 17 to 45 
percent less.  The impact of the penalties tends to be larger for the loans serviced by the 
small servicers.  The impact of prepay penalties on the probability of default is mixed 
(positive and only marginally significant for loans serviced by small servicers and 
insignificant for those serviced by large servicers).  These findings differ from Quercia et 
al. (2005), who found a positive relationship between prepayment penalties and default 
probabilities.  Consistent with the option theories the volatility of interest rates (house 
prices) is associated with a lower probability of prepaying (defaulting) for both the small 
and big servicer samples.  
  186.3  Unobserved Heterogeneity 
One of the advantages of the estimation approach used is the ability to estimate 
and hence control for unobserved heterogeneity through a semi-parametric approach, 
which does not assume a specific functional form.  In all specifications and samples the 
heterogeneity parameters are all significant at the 5 or 1 percent level.  Figures 3 and 4 
illustrate the proportional impact of the parameters on the estimated probabilities of 
termination.  Figures 3 and 4 show that for one group of loans, regardless of the servicer, 
there is a relatively low probability of default regardless of the value of the FICO score or 
any other covariate. Another group of loans have a much higher probability of defaulting 
for all values of FICO and a greater absolute sensitivity to changes in the FICO scores.
7    
In addition, the distribution of loans into groups is fairly similar for each sample.  For the 
large servicer sample, a little over one-half of the loans are associated with the fast 
termination groups while for the small servicer sample a little under one-half of the loans 
are associated with the fast termination group.  
7  Conclusion 
The servicer plays a key role in the mortgage market.  In fact, the servicer is the 
primary and sometimes only point of contact for the borrower after origination.  This 
paper asks the simple question of whether different servicers are associated with different 
probabilities of default and prepayment of securitized subprime loans after controlling for 
all observed loan, housing, and labor market conditions.   
Using a competing risk model of mortgage duration that allows for unobserved 
heterogeneity, the results find strong evidence that servicers are associated with large 
changes in the probability of a loan going into default or prepayment.  In addition the 
magnitude of the impact can be substantial.  For example, for eight large subprime 
  19servicers, the proportional impact on the probability of default, relative to the reference 
large servicers, varies from 60 to 555 percent.  Large servicers affect the probability of 
prepayment to a lesser but still substantial degree, ranging from 9 to 318 percent.  For 
eight smaller subprime servicers, the heterogeneity is also economically significant, but 
the proportional impacts are usually under 100 percent. 
These results indicate that, when valuing a pool of subprime mortgages, it is 
potentially more important to consider who is servicing the loans than the loan or pool 
characteristics.  The experience of borrowers in the subprime market will vary depending 
on who is servicing the loan.  Therefore, when selecting a lender, subprime borrowers 
should do additional homework, beyond looking at the lender, to determine who will end 
up servicing the loan. 
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  21Table 1: Top 25 Subprime Servicers 
Year Market  Share  Volume 
1995 16.2%  $47,098.3 
1996 31.7%  $89,847.9 
1997 45.4%  $144,749.0 
1998 55.6%  $191,332.2 
1999 63.9%  $244,404.6 
2000 67.2%  $279,559.7 
2001 68.3%  $326,926.0 
2002 73.7%  $423,082.3 
2003 77.8%  $543,944.6 
2004 84.8%  $825,300.1 
Source: The 2005 Mortgage Market Statistical Annual Volume 1, Top 25 B&C Servicers 
 








FICO score  660.86  596.73 655.62
Loan-to-value ratio  78.03  80.66 78.22
Prepayment penalties  47.4% 65.2% 52.9%
Low or no 
documentation 42.0% 32.7% 45.3%
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Estimation Samples  
Variable  Big servicer sample Small servicer sample
   Mean   Std. Dev.   Mean   Std. Dev.  
FICO 671.33  75.15 679.92 60.84
LNDOC 0.39  0.49 0.55 0.50
SEASON 0.01  0.11 0.02 0.14
CLTV 67.38  16.76 70.68 14.73
REFI 0.04  0.06 0.09 0.06
UNEMP 5.33  1.51 5.51 1.65
VARINT 0.47  0.24 0.51 0.25
VARHPI 0.34  0.23 0.30 0.21
PPEN 0.44  0.50 0.30 0.46
servicer 1  0.32  0.47 0.05 0.23
servicer 2  0.32  0.47 0.23 0.42
servicer 3  0.01  0.11 0.10 0.30
servicer 4  0.06  0.24 0.03 0.16
servicer 5  0.09  0.28 0.04 0.20
servicer 6  0.03  0.18 0.38 0.48
servicer 7  0.06  0.24 0.10 0.29
servicer 8  0.10  0.30 0.07 0.26
Number of loans  43,340  13,130 
  22Table 4: Standardized Elasticities 
      Big Servicer Sample     Small Servicer Sample 
Variable Default  Prepay Default Prepay
FICO -61.07%  -10.61% -36.15% 8.39%
LNDOC 37.86%  -7.34% 88.48% 6.06%
SEASON 73.15% 33.72% 181.81% 22.40%
CLTV 65.89%  -9.12% 65.80% -8.48%
REFI 13.73%  14.09% 38.88% 10.49%
UNEMP -5.62%  1.65% -12.73% -1.64%
VARINT 8.52%  -8.24% 25.02% -6.16%
VARHPI -8.77%  23.41% -7.37% 9.69%
PPEN -11.72%  -17.15% 2.31% -45.44%
servicer 1  --  -- -- --
servicer 2  60.09%  8.96% -- -65.04%
servicer 3  --  318.02% -- -8.30%
servicer 4  391.86%  89.60% -- -33.69%
servicer 5  555.81%  96.02% 54.10% -43.93%
servicer 6  438.36%  48.19% 105.98% -33.93%
servicer 7  274.68%  46.54% 31.00% -33.00%
servicer 8  --  133.85% -- -24.24%
Note: Elasticity is estimated as percentage changes in predicted probabilities in response 
to a one standard deviation change in the variable of interest.  For dummy variables, 
elasticity is the percentage change in probability as the variable goes from zero to one.  
Servicer 1-8 represents eight different servicers for the big and small servicer samples. 
  23Table 5: Elasticity of Time-varying Servicer Effects, Big Servicer Sample 
Variable  Default (%)  Prepay (%) 
servicer 1  --  -- 
servicer 2  11.1  31.1* 
servicer 2*2004  46.7*  9.4* 
servicer 2*2005  107.4*  0.3* 
servicer 3  --  311.9* 
servicer 4  275.7*  92.8* 
servicer 4*2004  450.1*  107.3 
servicer 4*2005  518.5*  87.6 
servicer 5  644.0*  132.7* 
servicer 5*2004  637.0  99.2* 
servicer 5*2005  335.4*  78.1* 
servicer 6  286.9*  26.1* 
servicer 6*2002  624.6*  66.5* 
servicer 6*2003  366.8  67.2* 
servicer 7  267.6*  53.3* 
servicer 7*2001  259.6  46.0 
servicer 7*2002  218.4  42.1 
servicer 7*2003  212.2  37.4 
servicer 8  --  137.3* 
Notes: Elasticity is percentage change in predicted probability as the variable goes from 0 
to 1.  For example, servicer#*year indicates the estimated percent change in the 
probability in that year.   Servicer interactions are added to Model 4 (with unobserved 
heterogeneity). * indicates statistical significance at 5% level or lower and are marked by 
the dark shading.
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Figure 4: 
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  26End Notes
                                                 
1 It is a coincidence that the same number of servicers is included in both samples. 
2 This also has the added appeal of removing the special servicer phase of servicing from 
the data set. 
3 The OFHEO house price index is only available in quarterly frequency, so we use linear 
interpolation to create monthly index.  
4 The author thanks Brian McCall for providing a copy of the Fortran code he developed 
to conduct the estimation.  Also see Appendix B of McCall (1996) for more details on the 
likelihood function. 
5 While the likelihood function is more general and allows N groups to be estimated, 
attempts to estimate three or more groups did not converge because mass point estimates 
approached zero for at least one group. 
6 Servicer 1 is the excluded servicer for both samples.  However, some servicers did not 
have enough observed defaults to include a reliable estimate of the servicer fixed effect 
on the probability of default. Therefore, servicers 3 and 8 for the big servicer sample and 
servicers 2, 3, 4, and 8 in the small servicer sample are part of the reference group. 
7 However, this sensitivity is identical in terms of proportional shifts within each sample. 
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Table A1: Big Servicer Sample, Default Coefficient Estimates 
Parameter  Without unobserved heterogeneity With unobserved heterogeneity
      Model 1     Model 2     Model 3     Model 4 
   Coeff.  T-stats Coeff. T-stats Coeff. T-stats Coeff. T-stats
FICO -0.91  -35.66 -0.75 -26.65 -1.17 -35.12  -0.95 -26.86
LNDOC 0.37  8.25 0.28 6.11 0.48 9.19  0.32 5.92
SEASON 0.63  5.14 0.30 2.31 0.99 6.24  0.55 3.30
CLTV 0.53  19.00 0.42 14.31 0.66 20.43  0.51 14.83
REFI 0.14  6.61 0.08 3.08 0.20 8.26  0.13 4.65
UNEMP -0.03  -1.04 -0.05 -2.24 -0.03 -1.06  -0.06 -2.12
VARINT 0.11  5.68 0.10 4.70 0.11 5.46  0.08 3.75
VARHPI -0.10  -3.65 -0.13 -4.54 -0.07 -2.29  -0.09 -2.99
PPEN 0.16  3.71 0.00 0.06 0.12 2.40  -0.12 -2.32
servicer 1  --  -- -- -- -- --  -- --
servicer 2  --  -- 0.68 5.48 -- --  0.47 3.58
servicer 3  --  -- -- -- -- --  -- --
servicer 4  --  -- 1.45 11.27 -- --  1.60 11.35
servicer 5  --  -- 1.62 12.64 -- --  1.89 13.69
servicer 6  --  -- 1.49 11.35 -- --  1.70 11.88
servicer 7  --  -- 1.21 9.23 -- --  1.33 9.37
servicer 8  --  -- -- -- -- --  -- --
age 0.11  17.15 0.11 16.93 0.19 21.94  0.18 22.36
age2 -0.15  -12.81 -0.16 -13.12 -0.19 -13.72  -0.19 -13.72
location1 3.3E-04  11.29 1.6E-04 7.50 3.3E-04 9.29  1.7E-04 6.85
location2 --  -- -- -- 1.3E-05 4.63  6.8E-06 4.43
Notes: For the estimation the continuous variables are normalized ((x-mean)/stdev).  The 
age2 parameter is scaled by 1/100.
  28Table A2: Big Servicer Sample, Prepay Coefficient Estimates 
Parameter  Without unobserved heterogeneity With unobserved heterogeneity
      Model 1     Model 2     Model 3     Model 4 
   Coeff.  T-stats Coeff. T-stats Coeff. T-stats Coeff. T-stats
FICO -0.07  -8.10 -0.07 -6.63 -0.15 -12.91  -0.12 -8.80
LNDOC 0.02  1.14 -0.05 -3.06 0.05 2.21  -0.08 -3.41
SEASON 0.34  5.97 0.17 2.99 0.53 7.38  0.30 4.20
CLTV -0.01  -1.14 -0.07 -7.67 -0.01 -0.48  -0.10 -8.35
REFI 0.16  33.62 0.12 21.18 0.18 29.91  0.14 18.84
UNEMP 0.03  3.24 0.02 2.75 0.02 1.92  0.02 1.68
VARINT -0.05  -6.06 -0.07 -7.87 -0.06 -6.57  -0.09 -9.54
VARHPI 0.21  26.48 0.20 24.66 0.23 23.35  0.22 21.74
PPEN -0.08  -4.65 -0.12 -6.24 -0.13 -5.82  -0.20 -8.02
servicer 1  --  -- -- -- -- --  -- --
servicer 2  --  -- 0.12 4.11 -- --  0.09 2.49
servicer 3  --  -- 1.17 22.79 -- --  1.56 20.64
servicer 4  --  -- 0.46 12.60 -- --  0.67 13.32
servicer 5  --  -- 0.43 11.68 -- --  0.71 14.74
servicer 6  --  -- 0.16 3.49 -- --  0.41 6.98
servicer 7  --  -- 0.21 5.08 -- --  0.40 7.68
servicer 8  --  -- 0.74 18.48 -- --  0.90 17.38
age 0.10  42.02 0.11 42.68 0.14 40.70  0.14 43.49
age2 -0.19  -35.31 -0.19 -36.12 -0.18 -28.66  -0.19 -29.35
location1 7.0E-03  35.52 5.8E-03 30.04 1.2E-02 28.30  8.5E-03 24.68
location2 --  -- -- -- 1.4E-03 12.58  9.6E-04 12.80
           
Support  points         
mass point 1  1.00  -- 1.00 -- 1.00 --  1.00 --
mass point 2  --  -- -- -- 1.41 19.83  1.18 22.76
               
Number of 
loans  43,340 43,340 43,340 43,340 
Log  likelihood  -88,523 -87,959 -88,248 -87,629 
Notes: For the estimation the continuous variables are normalized ((x-mean)/stdev).  The 
age2 parameter is scaled by 1/100.
  29Table A3: Small Servicer Sample, Default Coefficient Estimates 
Parameter  Without unobserved heterogeneity With unobserved heterogeneity
      Model 1     Model 2     Model 3     Model 4 
   Coeff.  T-stats Coeff. T-stats Coeff. T-stats  Coeff. T-stats
FICO -0.49  -14.37 -0.44 -10.61 -0.52 -14.43  -0.45 -10.41
LNDOC 0.65  9.55 0.61 8.76 0.68 9.38  0.64 8.52
SEASON 0.81  5.57 0.84 5.75 1.03 6.60  1.05 6.53
CLTV 0.50  10.84 0.48 10.38 0.54 11.41  0.51 10.67
REFI 0.28  9.25 0.33 10.87 0.29 9.38  0.33 10.70
UNEMP -0.08  -1.96 -0.09 -2.20 -0.12 -2.95  -0.14 -3.24
VARINT 0.14  4.32 0.23 6.47 0.13 4.20  0.22 6.33
VARHPI -0.09  -1.95 -0.09 -2.05 -0.07 -1.66  -0.08 -1.71
PPEN 0.21  3.15 0.15 2.08 0.11 1.48  0.02 0.29
servicer 1  --  -- -- -- -- --  -- --
servicer 2  --  -- -- -- -- --  -- --
servicer 3  --  -- -- -- -- --  -- --
servicer 4  --  -- -- -- -- --  -- --
servicer 5  --  -- 0.43 2.96 -- --  0.44 2.79
servicer 6  --  -- 0.75 7.41 -- --  0.73 6.98
servicer 7  --  -- 0.28 1.91 -- --  0.27 1.81
servicer 8  --  -- -- -- -- --  -- --
age 0.16  14.60 0.16 14.40 0.24 15.48  0.23 15.48
age2 -0.26  -11.95 -0.26 -11.77 -0.33 -13.76  -0.31 -13.28
location1 3.6E-04  7.12 2.3E-04 6.28 3.5E-04 6.09  2.4E-04 5.71
location2 --  -- -- -- 4.3E-05 3.02  3.0E-05 3.04
 Notes: For the estimation the continuous variables are normalized ((x-mean)/stdev).  The 
age2 parameter is scaled by 1/100.
  30Table A4: Small Servicer Sample, Prepay Coefficient Estimates 
Parameter  Without unobserved heterogeneity With unobserved heterogeneity
      Model 1     Model 2     Model 3     Model 4 
   Coeff.  T-stats Coeff. T-stats Coeff. T-stats  Coeff. T-stats
FICO 0.10  8.20 0.09 6.64 0.11 6.40  0.09 4.43
LNDOC 0.12  4.80 0.06 2.47 0.12 3.50  0.06 1.81
SEASON 0.04  0.55 0.06 0.83 0.29 2.78  0.22 2.11
CLTV -0.06  -5.11 -0.09 -7.38 -0.06 -3.49  -0.10 -5.43
REFI 0.15  21.39 0.12 14.36 0.15 16.32  0.11 10.62
UNEMP 0.04  3.88 0.02 1.97 0.00 -0.16  -0.02 -1.13
VARINT -0.03  -2.28 -0.05 -4.09 -0.05 -3.11  -0.07 -4.59
VARHPI 0.08  6.81 0.09 7.22 0.09 5.95  0.10 6.27
PPEN -0.45  -15.74 -0.46 -15.37 -0.66 -16.14  -0.65 -15.39
servicer 1  --  -- -- -- -- --  -- --
servicer 2  --  -- -1.08 -13.96 -- --  -1.12 -12.32
servicer 3  --  -- -0.03 -0.51 -- --  -0.09 -1.24
servicer 4  --  -- -0.30 -3.90 -- --  -0.44 -4.07
servicer 5  --  -- -0.51 -6.57 -- --  -0.62 -5.88
servicer 6  --  -- -0.38 -8.34 -- --  -0.45 -6.84
servicer 7  --  -- -0.41 -7.60 -- --  -0.43 -5.60
servicer 8  --  -- -0.50 -8.46 -- --  -0.30 -3.57
age 0.09  23.69 0.07 19.69 0.18 33.97  0.16 30.41
age2 -0.15  -19.70 -0.13 -16.37 -0.19 -19.02  -0.17 -16.45
location1 1.4E-02  24.12 2.4E-02 16.83 1.5E-02 19.44  2.6E-02 13.09
location2 --  -- -- -- 7.8E-04 10.54  1.5E-03 9.12
           
Support  points         
mass point 1  1.00  -- 1.00 -- 1.00 --  1.00 --
mass point 2  --  -- -- -- 0.84 27.49  0.82 26.36
               
Number  of  loans  13,130 13,130 13,130 13,130 
Log  likelihood  -37,652 -37,452 -37,334 -37,183 
 Notes: For the estimation the continuous variables are normalized ((x-mean)/stdev).  The 
age2 parameter is scaled by 1/100. 
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